First Step Act Sentencing Reforms and Compassionate Release Latest Federal Defense Update 20260725

Key Takeaways

The First Step Act's compassionate release mechanism under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) now permits defendants to file motions directly with the court after exhausting administrative remedies with the Bureau of Prisons — but the 30-day exhaustion clock and what constitutes a proper request remain fiercely litigated issues in 2026.
The U.S. Sentencing Commission's November 2023 amendments to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 dramatically expanded the categories of "extraordinary and compelling reasons" that can support compassionate release, including non-retroactive changes in the law and certain medical conditions that do not necessarily need to be terminal.
Section 403 of the First Step Act, which reduced mandatory minimum sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for stacked firearm offenses, continues to generate litigation over whether the reduced penalties apply retroactively to defendants sentenced before the Act's effective date — and the current state of the law demands careful analysis of each circuit's position.
Federal defendants and their families must understand that compassionate release is not a substitute for a direct appeal or a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 habeas petition, but it can provide a critical safety valve when circumstances have fundamentally changed since the original sentencing date.

How the Prisoner-Initiated Motion Mechanism Has Reshaped Federal Sentencing Relief Since 2018

In my 25 years as a federal prosecutor and now as a defense attorney representing individuals incarcerated in the federal system, I have witnessed a seismic shift in how inmates seek sentence reductions — a shift that began with the First Step Act of 2018 and has only accelerated through mid-2026. Before the Act took effect, only the Director of the Bureau of Prisons could file a compassionate release motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), and the BOP was notoriously reluctant to exercise that authority, approving only a handful of motions each year despite thousands of inmates who likely qualified for relief. Section 603(b) of the First Step Act changed everything by amending the statute to allow defendants themselves to file motions directly with the sentencing court after either fully exhausting their administrative remedies or waiting 30 days from the warden's receipt of their request, whichever occurs first. This procedural innovation has transformed compassionate release from a theoretical remedy into a practical litigation tool, and I have personally filed dozens of these motions since the amendment took effect, seeing firsthand how different district judges approach the exhaustion requirement with varying degrees of rigor. Some courts strictly require full exhaustion of the BOP's administrative remedy process — meaning a BP-9 request to the warden, a BP-10 appeal to the Regional Director, and a BP-11 appeal to the BOP's Central Office — while others treat the 30-day waiting period as an independent gateway to federal court jurisdiction. The circuit split on this issue remains unresolved in 2026, and the Supreme Court has yet to weigh in definitively, making it essential for defense counsel to understand the specific precedents governing the district where the motion will be filed.

The exhaustion requirement under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) is not jurisdictional in nature, as the Supreme Court clarified in United States v. Cotton and as multiple circuits have confirmed in the compassionate release context, but it functions as a mandatory claim-processing rule that the government can waive or forfeit if it fails to raise exhaustion as a defense. In my practice, I have seen prosecutors strategically choose not to contest exhaustion when the merits of a compassionate release motion are exceptionally strong, recognizing that fighting over procedural technicalities can backfire when a district judge is sympathetic to the defendant's circumstances. However, I have also encountered AUSAs who aggressively litigate exhaustion down to the smallest detail — arguing, for example, that a compassionate release request submitted to the warden failed to specify the exact extraordinary and compelling reasons later raised in the court motion, or that the defendant filed the court motion on day 28 rather than day 30, or that the request was addressed to the wrong BOP official. These arguments can succeed or fail depending on the judge, and I have learned never to assume that a seemingly straightforward exhaustion issue will be resolved in my client's favor. The critical lesson for anyone considering a compassionate release motion in 2026 is that the administrative request submitted to the warden must be drafted with the same care and legal precision as the motion that will eventually be filed in federal court, because the two documents will be compared side-by-side if the government raises an exhaustion challenge.

The Evolving Definition of Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons Under Amended U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13

For years after the First Step Act created the prisoner-initiated motion mechanism, federal courts operated in a state of profound confusion about what constituted "extraordinary and compelling reasons" to justify a sentence reduction, because the U.S. Sentencing Commission's policy statement at U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 had not been updated since before the Act and still referred only to BOP-filed motions. Some circuits, including the Second, Fourth, and Sixth, held that district courts were not bound by the outdated policy statement and could consider any reason they deemed extraordinary and compelling, while other circuits, notably the Third and the D.C. Circuit, took a more restrictive view and held that the policy statement still constrained judicial discretion even for defendant-filed motions. The Sentencing Commission finally resolved this chaos in November 2023 by promulgating comprehensive amendments to § 1B1.13 that took effect on November 1, 2023, and have been fully operational throughout 2024, 2025, and into 2026. The amended guideline now explicitly recognizes four categories of extraordinary and compelling reasons: medical circumstances of the defendant, age-related circumstances, family circumstances, and a catch-all provision that permits consideration of any other reason or combination of reasons that, considered together, are of comparable gravity to the enumerated categories. This catch-all provision, found at U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5), has become the most frequently litigated subsection in my compassionate release practice, because it opens the door to arguments based on changes in the law, rehabilitation, prison conditions, and other factors that do not fit neatly into the medical or family-circumstance boxes.

One of the most significant developments under the amended guideline is the explicit recognition that non-retroactive changes in sentencing law can constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason, provided that the change would produce a gross disparity between the sentence the defendant is serving and the sentence that would be imposed under current law, and the defendant has served a substantial portion of the original sentence. The application note to § 1B1.13(b)(6) instructs courts to consider the defendant's individualized circumstances and to avoid treating this provision as a mechanism for de facto retroactivity, but in practice, I have seen district judges across the country grant compassionate release motions precisely because they believe the original sentence was unjustly long under modern standards. For example, defendants who received mandatory life sentences under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) based on prior felony drug convictions that would no longer qualify as predicate offenses under Section 401 of the First Step Act have successfully argued that continuing to incarcerate them serves no legitimate penological purpose. Similarly, defendants sentenced under the old 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) stacking regime — where a second conviction carried a mandatory consecutive 25-year sentence even if charged in the same indictment — have obtained compassionate release by demonstrating that Congress itself recognized the excessive severity of those penalties when it enacted Section 403. These are not guaranteed outcomes, and I always caution clients and their families that compassionate release remains a discretionary remedy, but the legal landscape in 2026 is far more favorable to defendants than it was even five years ago.

Medical Compassionate Release in a Post-Pandemic World and the Enduring Impact of COVID-19 Precedent

When the COVID-19 pandemic swept through the federal prison system in 2020 and 2021, compassionate release motions based on medical vulnerability proliferated at an unprecedented rate, and the judicial decisions issued during that period continue to shape how courts evaluate medical-based claims in 2026. The amended U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1) now provides that a defendant's medical condition qualifies as extraordinary and compelling if the defendant is suffering from a terminal illness, or is suffering from a serious physical or medical condition that substantially diminishes the ability to provide self-care within the correctional facility and from which the defendant is not expected to recover, or is suffering from a condition requiring long-term or specialized medical care not being provided by the BOP. The guideline also recognizes that a defendant's risk of experiencing a medical deterioration or death if exposed to conditions of confinement, including infectious disease outbreaks, can constitute an independent extraordinary and compelling reason under § 1B1.13(b)(1)(D). This last provision represents a direct response to the COVID-19 litigation and has already been invoked in 2025 and 2026 in cases involving new COVID variants, influenza outbreaks, and other communicable diseases that pose heightened risks to medically vulnerable inmates. In my practice, I now routinely advise incarcerated clients to document every medical condition, every treatment interaction with BOP health services, and every denial or delay of care, because the administrative record is absolutely critical when establishing that the BOP cannot adequately manage a chronic condition within its facilities.

The medical compassionate release analysis also intersects with the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, which require the court to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense and provide just punishment, and the need to protect the public from further crimes. Even when a defendant presents a compelling medical case for release, the court must still weigh the § 3553(a) factors and determine that a sentence reduction is consistent with the purposes of sentencing, and this is where many compassionate release motions ultimately fail. I have seen defendants with terminal cancer diagnoses denied compassionate release because the district judge concluded that the seriousness of the original offense outweighed the humanitarian considerations, and I have seen elderly defendants with dementia granted release despite committing serious violent offenses decades earlier. The § 3553(a) analysis is intensely fact-specific and heavily dependent on the particular judge's sentencing philosophy, which is why I invest significant time in crafting individualized, narrative-driven motions that humanize my clients and demonstrate genuine rehabilitation rather than simply reciting medical diagnoses and legal standards. The BOP's own data on recidivism among compassionate release grantees — which shows extraordinarily low rates of reoffending — can be a powerful tool in this portion of the argument.

Procedural Traps, Evidentiary Requirements, and the Strategic Calculus of Filing in 2026

Over the course of my career, first as a federal prosecutor and now as a defense attorney, I have learned that the procedural details of a compassionate release motion can be just as important as the substantive arguments, and I have watched talented lawyers lose winnable motions because they overlooked the evidentiary and procedural requirements that courts demand. Every compassionate release motion filed under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) must be supported by a comprehensive set of exhibits that typically includes the administrative request submitted to the warden, the warden's response or proof that 30 days have elapsed without a response, current medical records from the BOP, any outside medical evaluations or expert reports, documentation of rehabilitative programming and educational achievements during incarceration, a detailed release plan that specifies where the defendant will live and how they will support themselves, and character letters from family members, prospective employers, and other community supporters. The release plan component deserves special emphasis because many judges will not grant compassionate release unless they are satisfied that the defendant has a concrete, viable plan for reintegration into the community, and a vague promise to live with family and look for work is almost never sufficient. I work closely with my clients and their families to develop release plans that include confirmed housing arrangements, verified employment opportunities or social security disability benefits, arrangements for medical care, and, where necessary, acceptance into residential reentry center programs or home confinement through the BOP's own placement procedures.

The strategic decision of when to file a compassionate release motion also requires careful calibration, because filing too early in a sentence — before the defendant has demonstrated meaningful rehabilitation — can result in a denial that prejudices future efforts, while waiting too long can mean that a deteriorating medical condition reaches a point of irreversible decline. I generally recommend that clients pursue compassionate release only after they have completed substantial rehabilitative programming, maintained a clean disciplinary record for a meaningful period, and developed a compelling narrative about their transformation, but there are exceptions for rapidly progressing terminal illnesses where time is of the essence. The relationship between compassionate release and other post-conviction remedies must also be carefully considered, because pursuing relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 based on constitutional or statutory violations is a fundamentally different legal vehicle with different procedural rules, different standards of review, and different potential outcomes. A defendant who has a viable § 2255 claim — for example, based on ineffective assistance of counsel or a retroactive Supreme Court decision — should generally pursue that remedy first or simultaneously, because success on a § 2255 motion can result in vacatur of the conviction or a full resentencing, whereas compassionate release only reduces the term of imprisonment without disturbing the underlying conviction. Navigating these intersecting procedural pathways requires experience, judgment, and a thorough understanding of federal criminal procedure.

Frequently Asked Questions About First Step Act Compassionate Release

Can I file a compassionate release motion if I have already filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 habeas petition?

Yes, you can file a compassionate release motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) even if you have previously filed a § 2255 motion, and there is no statutory bar against pursuing both forms of relief — but you must be aware of the significant procedural differences between the two remedies. A compassionate release motion is not subject to the one-year statute of limitations that applies to § 2255 petitions under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, and it is not subject to the stringent restrictions on second or successive petitions that often bar defendants from filing additional § 2255 motions after an initial denial. However, compassionate release only results in a sentence reduction and does not vacate the underlying conviction, while a successful § 2255 petition can result in the conviction being set aside entirely, which is why I carefully evaluate whether any viable habeas claims exist before recommending a compassionate release strategy. In my experience, judges are not generally hostile to defendants who pursue both remedies, but they do scrutinize whether a compassionate release motion is being used as an improper end-run around AEDPA's procedural requirements, so the motion should be grounded in genuinely changed circumstances rather than relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in prior habeas proceedings.

What happens if the BOP denies my compassionate release request at the administrative level?

Under the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a BOP denial at the administrative level does not prevent you from filing a motion directly with the sentencing court, and in fact the statute specifically contemplates that defendants may proceed to federal court after the warden denies their request or after 30 days have elapsed with no response from the warden. A BOP denial is not binding on the district court, and I have successfully obtained compassionate release for numerous clients whose requests were initially rejected by the warden, because federal judges exercise independent judgment and are not required to defer to the BOP's assessment of whether extraordinary and compelling reasons exist. However, the BOP's reasons for denial can be informative — they may reveal weaknesses in the release plan or suggest that additional medical documentation is needed — and I always obtain and carefully review the administrative denial before filing in court so that I can anticipate and preemptively address the arguments the government is likely to raise in opposition. The key point to remember is that a BOP denial is not the end of the road; it is often just the beginning of the litigation process.

If you or a loved one is serving a federal sentence and you believe that changed circumstances — whether medical, legal, or personal — may support a compassionate release motion